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Chinaʼs dairy industry was struck by a huge and tragic milk contamination scandal in the autumn of 2008. 
The scandal arose because melamine, a poisonous industrial chemical used for making plastics, fertilizers, ﬁre 
retardants, and other products, was added to milk to artiﬁcially elevate the protein content of the milk. Melamine 
was discovered in a host of Chinese dairy products, including milk powder, infant formula, ﬂuid milk, yogurt, 
ice cream, cookies, cakes, coffee products, and candy. Early ofﬁcial reports blamed melamine poisoning for four 
infant deaths and sicknesses in over 54,000 people. A subsequent report issued by Chinaʼs Ministry of Health in 
December 2008 showed that illnesses associated with melamine poisoning were more than ﬁve times greater than 
reported initially. 
While Chinaʼs milk contamination scandal made international headlines, milk contamination is not conﬁned to 
China. Farmers, middlemen, and processors in other developing countries adulterate milk with water and harmful 
chemicals. This Discussion Paper analyzes the implications of milk contamination problems that have arisen in 
China for international dairy businesses. 
China’s Milk Scandal
Twenty-two Chinese dairy processing ﬁrms, including Sanlu Dairy and three other members of Chinaʼs “Big 6” 
dairy processors, were identiﬁed in initial tests as sellers of melamine contaminated dairy products. Many addi-
tional processors were implicated in subsequent tests. Fonterra of New Zealand, which owns a 43 percent equity 
interest in Sanlu Dairy, and Sanlu came under scathing criticism in New Zealand and China for their handling of 
the milk contamination problem.
It is too soon to determine how effective the measures taken by Chinaʼs government and the domestic industry 
will be for dealing with the countryʼs complex, long-standing milk contamination problems. Interestingly, several 
major foreign companies (e.g., Fonterra, Nestle, and private equity group Kohlberg Kravis Roberts Company) 
have maintained, made, or increased ﬁnancial investments in Chinaʼs dairy industry, despite the melamine scandal. 
China will witness the formation of more integrated processing-milk production operations as mechanisms for 
avoiding future milk contamination problems. Whether these integrated operations will be fully successful models 
for operating in Chinaʼs dairy industry remains to be determined. 
A return to normalcy after Chinaʼs tragic melamine scandal will not occur quickly. It probably will be one to 
two years before quasi-normal milk production and dairy product consumption patterns resume in China. Foreign 
consumers may remain skeptical of the quality of Chinese food products containing dairy ingredients for a longer 
period. 
Implications for International Dairy Businesses
•  Foreign direct investors in Chinaʼs dairy industry and in the dairy industries of other countries with a history 
of milk contamination may ﬁnd it advisable to stress test their investments to see whether the investments 
have a reasonably high probability of remaining proﬁtable after a milk contamination scandal. 
MILK CONTAMINATION PROBLEMS IN CHINA—IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL DAIRY BUSINESSES
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*W.D. Dobson is an Agribusiness Economist with the Babcock Institute.  Helpful comments on the manuscript from Professor Edward 
Jesse of the Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics at the UW-Madison and Ms. Karen Nielsen, Associate Director of the 
Babcock Institute, are acknowledged. Milk Contamination Problems in China—Implications for International Dairy Businesses
2  Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-4
•  A foreign ﬁrm with a minority equity interest in a domestic dairy ﬁrm in a developing country may not be 
able to exercise the control needed to correct a problem in the event of a product scandal. 
•  Firms investing in dairy businesses in developing countries need procedures to safeguard the entire milk 
supply chain from the farm to food markets. Failure to do so will expose the ﬁrm to problems such as those 
encountered by Chinese dairy processors when middlemen-assemblers added melamine and water to milk 
purchased from farmers before delivering it to processing plants. 
•  Firms investing in Chinaʼs dairy industry may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to afﬁliate with dairy processing companies 
that operate their own farms, particularly if Chinaʼs government fails to adopt measures that substantially 
improve the quality of the countryʼs milk. Integrated farming-processing ﬁrms can be operated in ways 
that maintain the quality of the milk supply. However, large, integrated dairy farming operations can be 
challenging to operate proﬁtably because of herd health problems and diseconomies of scale. 
•  A multinational dairy companyʼs reputation for selling high quality dairy products can be damaged by 
problems in the ﬁrmʼs developing country units. While there is no evidence that New Zealand milk products 
were involved in the sales of any contaminated dairy products, Fonterra risks harming its brands and sullying 
the “clean-green” image of New Zealand dairy product companies as a result of association with problems 
encountered at Sanlu Dairy. 
•  Dairy exporters based in countries that have experienced milk contamination problems will need to 
make concerted efforts to ensure that they export safe products. Any hint of a renewed ﬂare up of milk 
contamination in their country is likely to be used by competing exporters to create real or “manufactured” 
concerns about product quality to gain market share at the expense of exporters based in countries with a 
history of milk contamination. Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-4  3
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The international spotlight focused on Chinaʼs dairy 
industry in the autumn of 2008 because of the huge 
and tragic milk contamination scandal that erupted in 
that industry. The scandal arose because melamine, a 
poisonous industrial chemical used for making plas-
tics, fertilizers, ﬁre retardants and other products, was 
added to milk. A nitrogen-rich compound, melamine 
was used to artiﬁcially elevate the apparent protein 
content  of  milk  adulterated  with  added  water,  and 
increase the price received for the milk. 
Melamine turned up in many Chinese dairy products 
including milk powders, infant formula, ﬂuid milk, 
yogurt,  ice  cream,  cookies,  cakes,  coffee  products, 
and candies. The most damaging effects of melamine 
poisoning were associated with baby formula, which 
caused kidney stones and kidney failure in infants. 
Early ofﬁcial reports attributed four infant deaths and 
sicknesses in over 54,000 people to melamine poison-
ing of milk. Chinaʼs Ministry of Health reported in 
early December 2008 that 294,000 people were sick-
ened by tainted milk products, more than ﬁve times the 
total reported earlier [5]. The longer-term impacts of 
melamine poisoning for the health of individuals who 
survived milk poisoning illnesses are unknown. 
Chinaʼs dairy scandal made international headlines, 
but problems with milk contamination are not unique 
to China. Farmers, middlemen, and processors in other 
developing countries adulterate milk with water and 
harmful  chemicals.  Milk  contamination  has  broad 
implications for the health of people in developing 
countries, costs and returns of foreign ﬁrms making 
direct investments in dairy businesses in these coun-
tries,  and  dairy  exporting  prospects  for  companies 
located in developing countries. 
This  Discussion  Paper  analyzes  implications  of 
milk contamination problems that have arisen in China 
for international dairy businesses. Emphasis is placed 
on China because of the importance of China as an 
importer of dairy products and an exporter of food 
products  containing  dairy  ingredients.  Moreover,  a 
number of implications ﬂow from Chinaʼs experience 
for other countries with milk contamination problems. 
Introduction
The Anatomy of China’s Milk Scandal. Chinaʼs 2008 
milk  scandal  occurred  in  a  large,  rapidly-growing, 
multi-product industry. Forecasts developed before the 
scandal indicated that Chinaʼs milk production would 
total  about  38  million  metric  tons  in  2008,  nearly 
a ﬁve-fold increase from the 8.3 million metric tons 
production total for 2000 [41]. The country is also an 
important  importer  of  nonfat  dry  milk,  whole  milk 
powder, and whey products. Chao, writing in the Wall 
Street Journal, characterized the growth in sales of 
dairy products in China as follows [7]: 
[Prior to the scandal] . . . dairy sales in China had 
been  booming.  According  to  market  researcher 
Euromonitor International, revenue from the sale 
of milk formula rose to $3.1 billion in 2007 from 
$1.4 billion in 2003, while revenue from other dairy 
products grew to $17.9 billion from $8.8 billion in 
the same period.
Chinaʼs dairy processing industry included a few 
giant processing ﬁrms and up to 1,600 smaller dairy 
processing ﬁrms in the mid-2000s [39]. The “Big 6” 
dairy processors operating in China in the mid-2000s 
are listed in Table 1. These processors accounted for 
more than one-half of the milk processed in China at 
mid-decade. As will be evident, the large number of 
smaller  milk  processors  makes  it  difﬁcult  for  gov-
ernment authorities to perform adequate milk quality 
CHINA’S MILK CONTAMINATION SCANDAL 
TABLE 1. The “Big 6” Dairy Processors in China.
Name of Firm  Headquarters Location
Mengniu Dairy Co., Ltd.  Inner Mongolia
Yili Industrial Co., Ltd.  Inner Mongolia
Bright Dairy & Food Co., Ltd.  Shanghai Municipality
Sanyuan Foods Co., Ltd.  Beijing Municipality
Sanlu Group Co., Ltd.  Hebei Province
Wandashan Dairy Co., Ltd.   Heilongjiang Province
Sources: Lu [26], Patton [37], and Market Watch [28].Milk Contamination Problems in China—Implications for International Dairy Businesses
4  Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-4
Albeit after initial delays, many contaminated Chi-
nese dairy products were pulled from domestic food 
markets and from store shelves in a number of foreign 
markets. Countries that issued food recalls or bans of 
Chinese  food  products  containing  dairy  ingredients 
include  the  U.S.,  European  Union,  Australia,  New 
Zealand,  Japan,  Singapore,  Malaysia,  Philippines, 
Indonesia, Taiwan, India, Viet Nam, Thailand, Kenya, 
and South Korea [2,8,42]. 
At least two products that may contain contami-
nated Chinese dairy ingredients were found in the U.S. 
shortly after news of the melamine scandal broke. The 
ﬁrst, White Rabbit candy, was recalled in September 
2008 from markets in nine U.S. states, including sev-
eral markets in Wisconsin [23]. The second, Koalaʼs 
crème-ﬁlled cookies distributed by Lotte USA, were 
made in China and may contain melamine. The Koala 
cookies were pulled from Battle Creek, Michigan food 
markets in October 2008 [46].
In November 2008, the U.S. Food and Drug Admin-
istration  (FDA)  issued  an  updated  warning  to  U.S. 
consumers  about  additional  Chinese  food  products 
that  may  contain  melamine  [43].  The  FDA  recom-
mended that consumers avoid Jacobina Biscuits, Yili 
Brand Milk Drinks, Blue Cat Flavored Drinks, several 
Mr. Brown Coffee Products, Mr. Brown Milk Tea, and 
infant  formula  manufactured  in  China.  Subsequent 
FDA  actions,  which  restrict  Chinese  food  product 
imports unless they are proven to be melamine-free, 
are discussed later. 
inspections.  The  complex  supply  chain  for  Chinaʼs 
dairy  industry  adds  to  the  difﬁculty  of  maintaining 
milk quality.
When  did  the  milk  scandal  start?  Stories  sur-
faced about the contamination of infant formula with 
melamine  on  September  11,  2008.  Hebei  province-
based Sanlu Dairy was found to be selling melamine-
laced infant formula that caused illnesses in infants. 
Accounts circulated that Sanlu Dairy knew of the con-
tamination months earlier but suppressed information 
on the problem. It soon became evident that milk con-
tamination with melamine was not conﬁned to Sanlu 
Dairy. 
Initial tests administered by Chinaʼs Administration 
for Quality, Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ) revealed the presence of melamine in infant 
formula marketed by 22 ﬁrms. The AQSIQ published 
results showing that 69 batches of infant formula pro-
duced by the 22 dairy companies tested positive for 
melamine [42]. Subsequently, 66 of 175 manufactur-
ers of infant formula were ordered to cease production 
because of melamine contamination of their products. 
Eighty-seven companies producing infant formula that 
tested negative for melamine remained in operation. 
Later  tests  revealed  melamine  contamination  of 
products  manufactured  by  other  dairy  ﬁrms.  These 
ﬁrms also were ordered to suspend operations. Some 
ﬁrms that had suspended production resumed opera-
tions late in 2008 after demonstrating that they had 
restored product quality at their plants.
TABLE 2. Selected Product Withdrawals Associated with Melamine Milk Contamination.
Date of Withdrawal  Companies and Products Withdrawn from Markets
September 12, 2008    Shijiazhuang Sanlu Group removes more than 8,000 tons of product from markets in China
September 14    Hong Kong supermarket chain, Wellcome, recalls a line of Yili Group iced yogurt bars
September 20    Japanʼs Mardudai Food recalls ﬁve products made by its Chinese joint venture business
September 22    Nestle recalls a line of milk in Hong Kong
September 26    White Rabbit Creamy candy recalled by U.S. distributor QFCO Inc. after being pulled from 
shelves in other countries
September 26    Taiwanʼs King Car Food recalls seven Mr. Brown coffee and milk-tea products
September 29  Cadbury pulls 11 products made at its Beijing plant from stores in Asia
September 30  Unilever Hong Kong recalls four batches of Lipton milk-tea powder in Hong Kong and Macau
Source: Canaves and Ye [4].Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-4  5
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Certain product withdrawals and prominent foreign 
ﬁrms involved in the withdrawals are noted in Table 
2. Among other things, the information suggests that 
a number of large multinational ﬁrms risked damage 
to their brands as a result of marketing contaminated 
food products. The relatively rapid withdrawal of the 
products from markets may have limited the damage.
Additional  products  with  international  brands, 
which  were  pulled  from  markets  outside  of  China 
because of concerns about melamine contamination 
are noted below [42]:
•  Lipton, 3-in-1 Tea Mix
•  Dove, Chocolates
•  M&Mʼs, Chocolates
•  Oreo, Cookies
•  Starbuckʼs, Milk
•  Nestleʼs, Follow-on Formula
•  Nabisco Brands, Chocolates
•  Snickerʼs, Candy Bars
•  Yum Brands, Cheese Powder
Major  Chinese  Firms  Involved  in  the  Milk  Scan-
dal. Two of Chinaʼs Big 6 dairy processors, Sanyuan 
Foods Co., Ltd. of Beijing Province and Wandashan 
Dairy Co., Ltd. of Heilongjiang Province, were found 
not to be marketing dairy products contaminated with 
melamine in initial tests. This distinction positions the 
two dairies to be viable competitors in Chinaʼs dairy 
industry and will perhaps enable the ﬁrms to acquire 
other companies damaged by the melamine scandal. 
These  two  ﬁrms,  of  course,  will  have  to  maintain 
melamine-free product status to take advantage of the 
favorable position. 
The  Chinese  dairy  ﬁrms  identiﬁed  as  sellers  of 
melamine  contaminated  dairy  products,  include  the 
following Big 6 dairy industry giants:
•  Sanlu Dairy
•  Yili Industrial Company, Ltd.
•  Mengniu Dairy Company, Ltd.
•  Bright Dairy & Food Company, Ltd. 
The  Big  6  ﬁrms  implicated  in  the  scandal  have 
attracted investments from major foreign dairy com-
panies. Fonterra of New Zealand, which acquired a 43 
percent equity interest in Sanlu Dairy in 2006, made 
one  of  the  noteworthy  investments.  Mengniu  is  a 
joint venture partner with Arla Foods of Sweden and 
Denmark. Bright Dairy Group was partly owned by 
Groupe Danone of France until October 2007 when 
Danone sold its interest in the Chinese ﬁrm [22]. 
Sanlu  was  one  of  Chinaʼs  largest  producers  of 
infant  formula.  The  companyʼs  low-cost  products 
were widely purchased by Chinese families, particu-
larly those living in rural areas. This ﬁrm and its for-
eign partner, Fonterra, came under scathing criticism 
in China and New Zealand when the infant formula 
was found to be contaminated with melamine and that 
Sanlu had been slow to withdraw the product from the 
market. 
The possibility of contamination of food products 
caused multinational food companies to conduct rapid 
analyses of the sources of ingredients for their food 
products. For example, the Tokyo-headquartered Lotte 
Group found that its Koala cookies sold in Hong Kong 
and  Macau  contained  contaminated  Chinese  dairy 
ingredients, prompting withdrawal of the cookies from 
those markets [14]. Lotte Group subsequently sought 
to reassure its customers that Lotte products sold in 
Japan did not contain Chinese dairy ingredients. Simi-
larly, Kraft Foods quickly notiﬁed its customers that 
none of its Oreo-brand products contain milk pow-
der from China [14]. While these actions make sense 
from business standpoint, it may not be simple for 
multi–nationals to identify the source of all food ingre-
dients since supply chains for products manufactured 
by multinational food ﬁrms sometimes span multiple 
countries. 
Why Did the Contamination of China’s Dairy Prod-
ucts Occur? What is there about Chinaʼs business envi-
ronment that would give rise to contamination of dairy 
products? Food contamination is, of course, a complex 
phenomenon  that  reﬂects  economic  factors,  ethical 
considerations, and the regulatory environment. 
Chao in a Wall Street Journal article characterized 
the economic environment in Chinaʼs dairy industry as 
follows [7]: 
The dairy industry is a competitive and low-margin 
business. Farmers sell milk to local dealers who in Milk Contamination Problems in China—Implications for International Dairy Businesses
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turn sell it to companies like Sanlu. Authorities say 
it was the dealers who added melamine to the milk.
This  simple  statement  says  a  lot.  Importantly,  it 
indicates that milk contamination can occur at differ-
ent points in the farm-to-market supply chain. But it 
leaves much unexplained. In particular, it fails to sug-
gest how difﬁcult it will be to deal with the problem. 
Speciﬁcally, it will be difﬁcult to guarantee milk qual-
ity in an industry that has rapidly evolved from one 
characterized by government ownership and control to 
a partially-privatized industry, characterized by frag-
mentation. It also may be difﬁcult to overcome temp-
tations associated with Chinaʼs history of apparently 
proﬁtable (for some) food contamination.  
Contamination and false labeling of Chinese dairy 
products is not new. In the mid-2000s, scandals hit a 
few major domestic and foreign dairy ﬁrms in China, 
causing  consumers  to  question  the  quality  of  dairy 
products [11,25]. Well-known ﬁrms were implicated 
in the scandals. Bright Dairy & Food Company was 
found to reprocess expired milk and to improperly date 
product containers, creating false impressions about 
the freshness of milk. Nestleʼs baby formula milk was 
found to contain excessive amounts of iodine. Infants 
died from consuming milk formula with no nutritional 
value made in Fuyang in East Chinaʼs Anhui Prov-
ince.
Wikipedia in a 2008 piece described the different 
facets of milk contamination in China in these terms 
[45, p. 6]:
Use of other potentially harmful chemical additives 
such as preservatives and hydrogen peroxide has 
been reported by independent media. Quality tests 
can be falsiﬁed with additives: peroxide is added 
to prevent milk going bad; industrial vegetable oil 
is emulsiﬁed and added to boost fat levels; whey 
is used to increase lactose content. However, such 
means and technology are seldom available to ordi-
nary farmers, meaning that the procurement chain 
is also implicated—milk agents are often politically 
well connected. The big dairy producers were com-
plicit in producing “test-tube milk.”
Fairclough in a Wall Street Journal article indicated 
that the Big 6 ﬁrm, Mengniu Dairy, and Nestle SA both 
knew that milk contamination had been going on for 
many years in China but didnʼt know that melamine 
was  one  of  the  contaminants.  Fairclough  described 
one of the non-melamine milk adulterants in graphic 
terms, as follows [18]:
Among other common milk additives: a viscous yel-
low liquid containing fat and a combination of pre-
servatives and antibiotics, know as “fresh-keeping 
liquid.”
C. MacLead, writing in USA Today, described food 
contamination in China in these terms [27]:
In 2004, fake Chinese-made baby formula that con-
tained minimal nutrition caused at least 12 deaths 
and malnutrition for hundreds of infants. Other inci-
dents in the past three years include cooked duck 
eggs  colored  with  industrial  red  dye,  vegetables 
with harmful pesticide residue, ﬁsh with dangerous 
pharmaceuticals, and vegetables and fruit injected 
with hormones.
Melamine contamination of eggs surfaced in China 
in October and November, 2008 in the aftermath of the 
milk scandal. The most likely source of melamine in 
eggs is chicken feed. Melamine appears to have been 
added to chicken feed to make it appear more protein 
rich—the same reason it was added to milk [3,18]. 
Concentration levels of melamine in eggs generally 
were lower than in contaminated milk but above lev-
els (2.5 parts per million) prescribed by Chinese safety 
authorities.
Pet  foods  contaminated  with  melamine  were 
detected in shipments from China to the U.S. in 2007. 
Melamine was added to wheat gluten and other pet 
food ingredients to artiﬁcially increase the protein con-
tent of pet foods. The contaminated pet food resulted 
in the death of an unknown number of dogs and cats in 
the U.S. Thus, the harmful effects of adding melamine 
to increase a productʼs protein content were known 
before the 2008 milk scandal. 
Ethical considerations involved in the scandal are 
difﬁcult to fully fathom and are largely beyond the 
scope  of  this  paper.  One  quantitative  measure  that 
might approximate the linkages between adulteration 
of milk and ethical factors is Transparency Internation-
alʼs Corruption Perceptions Index for China (Table 3). 
With a score of 3.6, China ranks substantially below 
dairy giants New Zealand and the U.S. In terms of all 
countries ranked, Chinaʼs score placed the country in Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-4  7
Milk Contamination Problems in China—Implications for International Dairy Businesses
72nd place in the 180 countries evaluated for 2008. A 
low score in the Corruption Perceptions Index might 
identify  a  business  environment  where  corrupt  and 
unethical practices are likely to emerge.
Ethical lapses, of course, are also evident in the 
information on economic factors associated with milk 
adulteration. This information suggests that some indi-
viduals knew of the harmful health effects of melamine 
but adulterated the milk with the chemical anyway. 
What  regulatory  steps  has  Chinaʼs  government 
taken to deal with the problem? As might be expected, 
Chinaʼs consumers were concerned about the govern-
mentʼs response to the milk contamination scandal. 
Fairclough describes the situation and the initial gov-
ernment remedies in these terms [17]:
The  scandal  has  badly  shaken  Chinese  consum-
ersʼ faith in the governmentʼs ability to protect the 
food supply. To restore conﬁdence, the government 
has sacked ofﬁcials, made dozens of arrests and 
deployed thousands of inspectors to dairy compa-
nies.
In addition, the Chinese government implemented 
recalls  of  various  dairy  products  in  mid-September 
2008 and again approximately a month later as the 
extent of the product contamination became evident. 
In the wake of the scandal, Chinaʼs government also 
took steps to prevent a repeat of the contamination 
problems.  Wang Yong,  director  of  Chinaʼs  General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine, said that Chinaʼs government intended to 
“make a substantial change in the production and dis-
tribution of dairy products [6].” The changes were to 
be implemented in part by the following measures: 
•  Dispatch 5,000 inspectors to supervise dairy 
factories around the clock to ensure raw materials 
are stored properly and quality-certiﬁed
•  Dispose of raw materials that have deteriorated 
or contain nonfood or recycled content
•  Require additives to be registered with quality-
supervision departments
•  Make inspections of exports comply with quality 
standards of importing nations
•  Encourage investigations and reward whistle 
blowers
•  Hold government ofﬁcials above county level 
liable for food safety problems
•  Solicit inexpensive, quick melamine testing 
methods 
Sanlu Dairy reported that the local government in 
Shijiazhuang city, where the ﬁrm is based, is requir-
ing the company increase its investment in imported 
melamine-testing equipment by ﬁve times to 5 mil-
lion yuan (U.S.$731,000) [6]. How this requirement 
will be affected by possible purchase of Sanlu by other 
Chinese processors is unclear. 
Fonterra’s Involvement in the Milk Scandal. Fon-
terraʼs involvement in the milk scandal was linked to 
the ﬁrmʼs equity interest in Sanlu Dairy. Sanlu started 
out as a large-scale state enterprise raising dairy cows 
and processing and packaging milk and milk powders. 
In the mid-2000s, the ﬁrm produced about 60 variet-
ies of milk powder, including baby formulas and nutri-
tional supplements, and had expanded into liquid milk, 
yogurt, and ﬂavored drinks [31]. Sanlu believed that it 
would beneﬁt from partnering with Fonterra since this 
would give the ﬁrm access to Fonterraʼs management 
experience, R&D, and advanced marketing skills. 
Fonterra, the worldʼs largest dairy exporting ﬁrm, is 
the mega cooperative formed by the merger of the New 
Zealand Dairy Group, Kiwi Cooperative Limited, and 
the New Zealand Dairy Board in 2001. The coopera-
tive receives milk from about 11,000 producer-mem-
bers in New Zealand and 2000 Australian farmers. It 
recorded  revenues  of  about  NZ$19.5  billion  (about 
US$14.3 billion) for the 14-month period ending on 
July 31, 2008 [34]. Fonterra completed the purchase 
TABLE 3. Corruption Perceptions Index, 2008.
  Index  Rank Among 180 
Country  Number  Countries Evaluated
China  3.6  72 (tied with 7 other countries)
New Zealand  9.3  1 (tied with 2 other countries)
U.S.  7.3  18 (tied with 2 other countries)
Source:  Transparency  International  [40].  Key  for  interpreting 
scores: 10 = highly clean, 1 = highly corrupt. High, median, and 
low scores for 180 countries ranked equal 9.3,3.4, and 1.0, respec-
tively. Milk Contamination Problems in China—Implications for International Dairy Businesses
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of the 43 percent equity interest in Sanlu Dairy for 
U.S.$107 million in 2006. 
Mr. Andrew Ferrier, Fonterraʼs CEO, commented as 
follows in 2006 about the ﬁrmʼs purchase of the equity 
interest in Sanlu Dairy [36]:
Developing  a  closer  working  relationship  with 
Sanlu is the logical next step for Fonterraʼs business 
in China . . . It complements our existing import-
ing and consumer businesses there by partnering us 
with a local company that has access to local fresh 
milk supplies . . . New Zealand has been a successful 
exporter of dairy ingredients to China for decades, 
but as local production increases to meet the rap-
idly growing local demand, becoming part of the 
local industry will give Fonterra further opportuni-
ties to employ our expertise in all areas of the busi-
ness from milk collection to consumer goods.
The Fonterra-Sanlu partnership made sense from 
a  business  standpoint  for  reasons  described  by   
McKinsey  analysts,  Cheung  and  Grant,  in  a  2006 
report. Cheung and Grant described the coming shake-
out in Chinaʼs dairy processing industry, the reasons 
for the shake-out, and the more concentrated industry 
that would result, as follows [13]: 
Milk  beverages  and  yogurt,  for  example,  are   
innovation-driven products requiring strong R&D 
formulation and consumer segmentation skills, and 
many domestic dairy industry have little of either . . 
. the top ﬁve Chinese dairy companies, for instance, 
spend  less  than  1  percent  of  their  revenues  on 
R&D, compared with 3 to 4 percent for their West-
ern counterparts . . . The domestic companies must 
build  new  capabilities  in  such  areas  as  product 
development, branding, account management and 
marketing . . . But many of the smaller companies 
without such advantages (advantages gained in part 
from teaming with foreign ﬁrms) are likely to disap-
pear in a wave of consolidation . . . We expect that 
by 2010 more than half of Chinaʼs 1,600 domestic 
dairy manufacturers will fail to survive the transi-
tion (emphasis supplied).
If one accepts the McKinsey analystsʼ view, it fol-
lows that the larger, surviving processors in Chinaʼs 
dairy  industry  will  employ  advanced  technologies, 
upgraded management skills, and R&D acquired, in 
part, from foreign investors. Further, it is no stretch to 
conclude that because the Fonterra-Sanlu Dairy part-
nership included these attributes, it might be a success-
ful model for Chinaʼs future dairy processing industry. 
Moreover, Fonterra undoubtedly was aware of for-
eign investment strategies that had failed previously 
in Chinaʼs dairy industry. For example, several well-
known foreign ﬁrms (e.g., Kraft, Danone, Parmalat, 
Unilever, and Friesland-Coberco) invested in Chinaʼs 
dairy  processing  industries  in  the  1990s.  With  few 
exceptions, these ﬁrms suffered losses and withdrew 
from the market, frequently selling their dairy process-
ing assets for cents on the dollar to domestic ﬁrms. 
Chen Yu, a Beijing-based dairy marketing consul-
tant, indicated that the mistakes made by the foreign 
dairy ﬁrms in China in the 1990s included the follow-
ing [26]: 
•  Most foreign ﬁrms did not operate their own 
dairy farms in China. Chinese consumers value 
freshness highly. And Chinaʼs consumers do not 
consider imported milk to be as fresh as milk 
produced by domestic companies, some of which 
operate dairy farms.
•  Foreign companies failed to gain access to 
valuable distribution networks that extend into 
many cities and communities. 
•  Foreign processors largely misread the buying 
habits of urban consumers, leading to incorrect 
positioning of their products. Parmalat, for 
example, focused mainly on marketing its 
expensive high-end products in China. Its fruit-
ﬂavored yogurt (100 grams) was sold at 2 yuan 
(U.S.$0.24) per cup, double the price of similar 
local brands. 
•  Foreign ﬁrms seldom used television or 
newspaper advertising to promote their products, 
which was a questionable marketing strategy in 
Chinaʼs immature market where customers have 
little brand loyalty and are readily inﬂuenced by 
advertising and promotion.
•  High operating costs contributed to problems 
of the foreign ﬁrms in an industry where proﬁt 
margins are thin. In some cases, high salaries 
for expatriates consumed a major portion of the 
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Fonterra through its equity interest in Sanlu Dairy 
was positioned to avoid many, if not all, of these prob-
lems and be successful in Chinaʼs dairy industry. These 
advantages plus the extensive experience that Fonterra 
and its predecessor organizations had with joint ven-
tures in many foreign countries should have produced 
a partnership with a high probability of success. 
But  despite  Fonterraʼs  apparently  well-conceived 
plans, the cooperative found itself damaged by Sanluʼs 
heavy involvement in the milk contamination scandal. 
The approximate sequence of developments surround-
ing Fonterraʼs involvement in the milk scandal appears 
in Table 3. 
Fonterra came under strong criticism in New Zea-
land and China because of the delay between the time 
that  Fonterra  knew  of  milk  contamination  at  Sanlu 
Dairy  and  when  news  of  the  milk  contamination 
became public in China. The delay spanned the August 
2, 2008 through September 10, 2008 period. And it 
was not until Helen Clark, then New Zealandʼs Prime 
Minister, notiﬁed Chinese government ofﬁcials in Bei-
jing of the melamine poisoning that rapid and public 
action to deal with the problem was initiated.
Fonterra  is  a  well-run  organization.  Fonterraʼs 
management undoubtedly knew that prompt action is 
required when a problem such as food poisoning is 
uncovered. A generally accepted principal is that dam-
age to a ﬁrm can be sharply limited by quick, effective 
action to recall a contaminated product and put in place 
measures to prevent a recurrence of the problem.
What  prevented  Fonterra  from  taking  prompt 
action?  Obviously  Fonterra  was  concerned  about 
Sanluʼs refusal to go public with product withdrawal 
information after August 2. The cooperative consid-
ered going public outside of China to force Sanlu and 
Chinaʼs government to go public with product contam-
TABLE 3. Fonterraʼs Response to Melamine Contamination of Dairy Products at Sanlu Dairy.
Date  Development and Response
August 2, 2008    Sanluʼs board of directors, including Fonterra executives, were informed of melamine contamination of 
Sanluʼs dairy products.
August 2 thru  Fonterra encouraged Sanlu and local Chinese authorities to withdraw Sanluʼs contaminated dairy 
September 4, 2008    products from the market. Sanlu agreed to withdraw contaminated dairy products but refused to go 
public with the announcement, citing the need for social stability as well as protection of public health. 
Sanlu, as promised, began quietly recalling 10,000 tons of tainted milk powder from the market. 
Fonterra considered going public outside of China to pressure Sanlu and Chinese government ofﬁcials 
to go public with announcements of the product contamination and product withdrawal plans, but 
abandoned this option. Fonterra ofﬁcials in Beijing and New Zealand held conference calls on how to 
deal with the scandal but apparently came to no substantive agreement until September 5.
September 5 to  New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark was told of the problem on September 5. Three days later  
September 10, 2008    she ordered that Chinese authorities in Beijing be notiﬁed. Chinese government ofﬁcials then took 
action against Sanluʼs managers and launched investigations into the safety of products marketed by 
other Chinese dairy companies and product withdrawals. 
September 11, 2008    Sanlu Dairy publicly disclosed that its products were contaminated. Information about product contam-
ination at Sanlu and a number of other dairy companies began to circulate in China and in the interna-
tional media. Sanluʼs board chairwoman and general manager, Tian Wenhua, was ﬁred in the wake of 
the incident. Wu Xianguo, the Communist Party chief of Shijiazhuang in Hebei Province was ﬁred for 
delaying reports of the issue to higher authorities and incompetence in disposition of the matter.
September 24, 2008    Fonterra booked a NZ$139 million (US$95 million) impairment charge against the carrying value of its 
investment in Sanlu. This left a residual value of NZ$62 million (U.S.$43 million) in Sanlu, mainly its 
physical plant. Fonterra wrote off the value of the Sanlu brand. However Fonterraʼs board of directors 
said they would continue the ﬁrmʼs long-term strategic commitment to China.
Sources: Wall Street Journal [8,9,32,33] and New Zealand Herald [30]. Milk Contamination Problems in China—Implications for International Dairy Businesses
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ination  and  withdrawal  information,  but  abandoned 
this option. Mr. Andrew Ferrier, Fonterraʼs CEO, said 
that such action would have caused Fonterra to “lose 
control of the whole thing [33].” The full implications 
of this comment are not clear.
A  key  factor  that  undoubtedly  delayed  public 
announcements  of  the  milk  scandal  was  the  pres-
ence of the Beijing Olympic Games, which ran from 
August 8–August 24, 2008. These games were sched-
uled to begin less than one week after Fonterra learned 
of the milk contamination at Sanlu Dairy. Chinaʼs gov-
ernment would have been embarrassed if international 
headlines about the milk scandal had surfaced immedi-
ately before or during the Olympic Games. It is thus no 
surprise that Sanluʼs management and the local Com-
munist Party ofﬁcials in Hebei Province were reluc-
tant to issue public pronouncements about the milk 
poisoning and product withdrawal on or immediately 
after August 2. It might also have damaged Fonterraʼs 
business prospects in China if the ﬁrm had gone public 
outside of China to force public announcements of the 
milk scandal. Fonterra clearly was not indifferent to 
the consequences of delays for the health of Chinese 
consumers of Sanluʼs products but could not ﬁgure out 
how to deal effectively with the problem. 
Fonterra found it necessary to take the NZ$139 mil-
lion (U.S.$95 million) impairment charge as a result 
of problems at Sanlu Dairy. And the value of the Sanlu 
brand has been destroyed. It is unclear what will be 
the ﬁnancial impact on Fonterra of a possible take-
over of Sanlu by a Chinese dairy company that was 
not involved in the milk scandal. It is also unclear how 
much any lawsuits brought against Sanlu and Fonterra 
will cost the New Zealand cooperative.
Armed with hindsight, a few observers have point-
edly  criticized  Fonterra  for  failing  to  exercise  the 
authority the ﬁrm possessed and for not being better 
prepared  for  the  scandal.  One  critic  questioned  the 
cooperativeʼs  continuing  strategic  commitment  to 
China. 
Dr. Deborah Petty, Strategy Advisor with Oxford 
Metrica in Britain, said Fonterraʼs 43 percent equity 
interest in Sanlu meant it had enough clout to deal 
with the crisis well before it did [44]. Petty asserted 
that “They [Fonterra] are a big shareholder, not just 
a stakeholder. That makes a difference.” She added 
that having three directors on the board also gave Fon-
terra  “ample  opportunity  to  communicate  and  take 
responsibility.” The reports of Pettyʼs comments noted 
with approval that Fonterra has given NZ$8.4 million 
(about US$5.0 million) to set up a rural maternity and 
infant community healthcare program in China.
G. Cumming, writer for the New Zealand Herald, 
argued that Fonterra should have been aware of the 
risks associated with milk contamination in China, as 
follows [12]: 
. . . Fonterra must have been aware of the risk of 
product-tampering  in  China.  When  the  news  [of 
melamine  poisoning  of  milk]  reached  New  Zea-
land this week, a Venture Southland ofﬁcial, Steve 
Canny, recalled the concerns of a Chinese business-
man negotiating to buy 1,500 tons of baby formula 
in Southland earlier this year. He insisted the for-
mula be supplied in sealed 1 kg containers to avoid 
the risk of contamination with materials like talcum 
powder or chalk once it reached China.” 
Financial writer, S. Louisson, commented as fol-
lows about the damage to Fonterraʼs reputation and 
questioned  the  wisdom  of  the  decision  by  the  co– 
operativeʼs board of directors to maintain its long-term 
strategic commitment to China [24]: 
Beyond the human toll, the scandal has damaged 
Fonterra managementʼs reputation—the coopera-
tive bosses took far too long to take effective action 
. . . Fonterraʼs CEO, Andrew Ferrier, downplays 
the melamine disaster on the basis that Sanlu rep-
resents a relatively small investment. But the farm-
ers may see it differently—as more trouble than it 
is worth and a sign management canʼt control its 
sprawling empire. 
Fonterra has worked with Sanlu Dairy to put in place 
improved testing procedures to identify milk contami-
nation at the dairy. After doing so, Fonterra pointed out 
that melamine poisoning of milk was unusual and that 
few, if any, dairy companies elsewhere in the world 
had tested for the presence of melamine in milk. 
There is an axiom in business and government that, 
“Extreme cases make bad policy.” Fonterra undoubt-
edly faced an extreme case in connection with the milk 
poisoning scandal at Sanlu Dairy. Indeed, because the 
scandal coincided with the Beijing Olympics, it was 
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Fonterra might have “stress tested” its strategies for 
the equity investment with Sanlu Dairy to assess how 
the operation would perform in the presence of a major 
milk scandal. But, prior to the milk scandal, there were 
arguably  so  many  possible  negative  developments 
in Chinaʼs dairy industry that it would be difﬁcult to 
know whether milk contamination should be included 
in a stress test. Thus, it is questionable whether Fon-
terra could have accurately anticipated the full impact 
of the melamine scandal. However, given the huge and 
tragic experience with milk contamination in China in 
the autumn of 2008, it appears that stress testing will 
be a useful strategy for future foreign investors in Chi-
naʼs dairy industry. 
Developments in the Wake  
of the Melamine Scandal
Milk contamination is a pervasive, long-standing 
problem in Chinaʼs complex, fragmented dairy indus-
try. It is too early to tell how effective the steps taken 
by Chinaʼs government and the domestic industry will 
be for fully remedying the countryʼs milk contami-
nation  problems.  However,  developments  that  have 
unfolded in the wake of the scandal reveal some frag-
mentary information about how the scandal is being 
handled by Chinaʼs government, how foreign govern-
ments are responding to the scandal, how the scandal 
has affected dairy product sales and proﬁts in Chinaʼs 
dairy  industry,  and  how  foreign  competitors  have 
responded to Chinaʼs milk poisoning scandal. 
Actions by China’s Government. Chinaʼs AQSIQ 
announced on October 17, 2008 that it had cancelled 
910 food production licenses of 872 enterprises, of 
which 66 licenses were for dairy products or dairy 
drinks [10]. The Sanlu Group was included in the list 
of ﬁrms subject to the cancellation. For Sanlu, it means 
that the ﬁrm no longer has a license to produce infant 
formula and young child formula milk powder. 
Simultaneously,  many  Chinese  dairy  plants  that 
had been forced to suspend production because of the 
scandal began resuming production. By mid-Novem-
ber 2008, 638 Chinese dairy companies had resumed 
production, representing about 80 percent of the total 
ﬁrms that had suspended production in the aftermath 
of the scandal [10]. 
Actions by Foreign Governments. Foreign govern-
ments have restricted or prohibited imports of Chi-
nese foods containing dairy ingredients. A noteworthy, 
second-stage action was taken by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) in mid-November 2008. 
Writing in the Wall Street Journal, Zhang and Mundy 
described this action as follows [47]: 
The FDA directive requires importers to prove their 
food and drink shipments do not contain the indus-
trial chemical melamine before they can be released 
to U.S. markets. The order may affect a big chunk 
of Chinaʼs $3.8 billion in annual food and bever-
age exports to the U.S. (see Table 4) . . . The agency 
said it wonʼt release the imported food unless an 
independent laboratory veriﬁes that representative 
samples contain no melamine or cyanuric acid, a 
melamine  derivative.  The  products  can  also  be 
released if labels or manufacturing records show 
they donʼt contain milk. 
The  FDA  action  could  drive  up  Chinese  export-
ersʼ costs since foods made with milk, and any other 
foods in the same shipping container, would be held 
in port pending clearance. Mr. Ben England, a former 
FDA ofﬁcial who now advises Chinese exporters, said 
“This will stop a lot of cargo anywhere from six weeks 
to three months . . . This is going to be very, very 
expensive  [47].”  Partly  this  is  because  some  semi- 
perishable  products  will  go  out  of  condition  while 
awaiting approval to enter the U.S. Presumably, the 
delays mentioned by England will be much shorter 
once Chinaʼs food manufacturers secure the services 
TABLE 4. Value of Food and Beverage 
Exports from China, 2007.
Receiving  Value of Chinese  
Market  Exports (US$ Bil)
Japan  US$7.30
U.S.  3.83
Hong Kong  2.71
South Korea  2.56
Russia  1.14
Source: Wall Street Journal [47].Milk Contamination Problems in China—Implications for International Dairy Businesses
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Chinaʼs dairy farmers were hit hard by processorsʼ 
decisions to reduce or terminate milk intake and, in 
some cases, to stop buying milk from small dairy farm-
ers. On the latter point, Bright Dairy stopped buying 
milk from smallholders after the scandal [10]. Bright 
Dairy announced that it would buy milk only from 
farmers who joined farming districts where systems 
are in place to permit better quality control than is pos-
sible when milk is purchased from individual small-
holders. This was not a drastic step since Bright Dairy 
obtained only about 5 percent of its milk supply from 
smallholders. Moreover, it is not clear how many addi-
tional milk processing ﬁrms will follow Bright Dairyʼs 
lead. But, if a large number do, it would be disruptive, 
since smallholders account for as much as 60 percent 
of Chinaʼs milk supply [10]. 
Chinaʼs Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agri-
culture  reported  on  September  26,  2008  that  relief 
payments  would  be  made  to  dairy  farmers  to  tide 
them through the rough times following the milk scan-
dal [42]. Vice Minister of Agriculture, Gao Hongbin, 
announced in early November 2008 that dairy farmers 
in Inner Mongolia, Hebei, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Shan-
dong, and Henan Provinces have received 300 million 
yuan (U.S.$44 million) from the Ministries of Agri-
culture and Finance to offset their losses [38]. Dairy 
farmers may require longer-term relief payments, par-
ticularly if smallholders ﬁnd it difﬁcult to maintain 
markets for their milk. 
Responses from Foreign Companies. Interestingly, 
a number of foreign ﬁrms have indicated that they will 
retain, make, or expand investments in Chinaʼs dairy 
industry, as noted below:
•  Fonterra, as noted earlier, plans to continue its 
strategic commitment to Chinaʼs dairy industry. 
However, it may be too early to judge the extent 
of this commitment since it will be affected 
by any sale of Sanlu to other dairy companies 
in China and any legal actions taken against 
Fonterra and Sanlu by persons harmed by the 
melamine contamination. 
•  U.S. private equity ﬁrm, Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts & Company (KKR) will invest about 
US$100 million in the Mengniu Modern Animal 
of independent testing ﬁrms, which verify at the time 
of production that a food item is melamine-free. 
In the November 2008, the FDA announced plans to 
open ofﬁces in three Chinese cities. These ofﬁces are 
part of a new effort to cooperate with Beijing on food 
safety [47]. 
Sales  and  Financial  Losses  of  China’s  Domestic 
Firms and Dairy Farmers. The China Daily reported 
that the countryʼs exports of dairy produce plunged 92 
percent in October 2008, compared to a year earlier 
[21]. 
Mr. Peder Tuborgh, CEO of Arla Foods, reported in 
November 2008 that sales at the ﬁrmʼs joint venture 
business with Mengniu Dairy were about one-half of 
pre-milk scandal levels and that it would be more than 
a year before dairy product sales return to normal in 
China [19].
The U.S. Dairy Export Council (USDEC) reported 
the  following  information  on  sales  reductions  and 
losses incurred by Chinaʼs two biggest milk processors 
in the aftermath of the scandal [42]:
•  Sales of Mengniu and Yili dropped by more than 
80 percent in the second half of September 2008 
and their daily intake of raw milk was reduced by 
81.5 percent to 3,672 metric tons. 
•  Mengniu and Yili have taken products off shelves 
worth U.S.$900 million. It is estimated that the 
two ﬁrms will incur an additional loss of over 
US$500 million, if the depressed sales situation 
continues for four to ﬁve months. 
In part, the reduced milk intake by Mengniu and Yili 
may reﬂect the fact that the two ﬁrms have stopped 
buying from, or took control of, the small milk depots 
in their supply chain after news of melamine poisoning 
of milk broke in September 2008 [1]. These ﬁrms are, 
in essence, copying part of a Nestle strategy. Nestle 
states that it has avoided the middlemen since opening 
its ﬁrst Chinese plant in 1987. Nestle says that it buys 
directly from farmers and that the milk is checked for 
quality at the farm before the containers are sealed. 
The milk is then transported to the factory, where it 
is tested again. Nestle claims that this buying practice 
promotes traceability and accountability over the over-
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Husbandry Group, which was founded in 2005 
[5]. In late 2008, the Mengniu Animal Husbandry 
Group operated four large farms and was in the 
process of opening an additional three, with a 
total of 26,000 cows. The Group plans to build 
25 to 30 additional farms in the next two years. 
KKR and the equity groupʼs Chinese partners 
believe that the large farms with proven milk 
quality maintenance procedures will thrive in 
the aftermath of the melamine milk scandal. The 
Mengniu Animal Husbandry Group will bear 
watching to see whether it is a successful model 
for Chinaʼs dairy industry. 
•  Nestle has indicated that the company will 
continue to invest in Chinaʼs dairy industry. The 
company plans to expand processing capacity in 
Inner Mongolia and Qingdao and to introduce 
new products, despite the melamine incident 
[10]. Nestle also has invested US$10 million 
to build an R&D center in Beijing, which will 
conduct research on food safety and quality. 
Actions by Foreign Competitors. As expected, for-
eign dairy companies and afﬁliated organizations are 
taking actions to demonstrate that their products are 
melamine-free. For example, the USDEC developed 
a Melamine Certiﬁcation Program, which qualifying 
exporters can employ to assure buyers of U.S. dairy 
products that the products are melamine-free. This cer-
tiﬁcation program is funded by USDEC member dues. 
The language in the USDEC certiﬁcation document 
reads as follows [42]: 
USDEC conﬁrms that neither melamine nor cyanu-
ric acid were detected at levels that exceed the U.S. 
tolerance level of 2.5 ppm in the (insert product 
name(s)) of (insert company name). This conclusion 
is based on an analysis of samples submitted to the 
USDA National Science Laboratory by the product 
manufacturer, following USDA sampling protocols 
from randomly generated Julian dates for (insert 
as appropriate) quarter of (insert year), using the 
liquid chromatography/mass spectrometry (LC/MS/
MS) test method.
The USDEC plans to phase out industry testing for 
melamine if the U.S. government resumes appropriate 
testing for this contaminant. It is not certain whether 
a phase-out will be feasible since the U.S. Environ-
mental  Protection Agency  concluded  in  May  2000 
that cyromazine (melamine is a metabolite of parent 
compound cyromazine) in milk is no longer a residue 
of concern. The status of USDECʼs efforts to secure 
appropriate U.S government testing for melamine is 
unclear at this writing.  
USDEC ofﬁcials made the following observations 
about the immediate and likely future impact of Chi-
naʼs melamine scandal on international dairy markets 
[42]:
•  Demand for U.S. exports of dairy products 
shrunk rapidly immediately after the scandal. 
•  Customs clearance for U.S. dairy exports to 
China were delayed due to inspectors being pre-
occupied with the domestic melamine crisis. 
•  Payment delays and delinquencies are expected 
because of cash ﬂow problems affecting Chinese 
buyers of dairy products. 
•  Demand for U.S. dairy products will rebound 
in the medium term, especially for food product 
ingredients. 
•  It will take one to two years before Chinaʼs 
consumers regain conﬁdence in domestically-
produced dairy products. Higher income Chinese 
consumers may seek out foreign dairy brands 
while they observe the effectiveness of actions 
taken in the domestic industry to improve dairy 
product quality. 
•  In the longer-term, the demand for U.S. dairy 
ingredients and cheeses will continue to rise in 
China. 
USDECʼs estimates of the time it will take for dairy 
exports to China to return to approximately normal 
levels appear reasonable. A fundamental question for 
Chinaʼs dairy industry is: How long will it take for the 
country to achieve somewhat normal exports of dairy 
products and food items containing dairy ingredients? 
The long-standing use of melamine and a host of other 
dangerous contaminants presumably will cause for-
eign customers to be skeptical of the quality of Chinaʼs 
dairy-food products until there is durable proof that 
the products are contaminant free. Some of Chinaʼs Milk Contamination Problems in China—Implications for International Dairy Businesses
14  Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-4
larger dairy processing ﬁrms appear to be taking steps 
to reduce chances of future milk contamination. It is 
less clear that the hundreds of smaller milk processing 
plants operating in China are putting in place similar 
safeguards. It is safe to conclude that Chinaʼs dairy 
industry is a risky place in which to do business in the 
aftermath of the milk scandal.
Implications for International Dairy Businesses 
A  number  of  points  emerge  from  the  melamine 
scandal that foreign dairy ﬁrms investing in China or 
other developing countries might ﬁnd it useful to note:
•  Foreign direct investors in Chinaʼs dairy industry 
and in the dairy industries of other countries 
with a history of milk contamination may ﬁnd it 
advisable to stress test their investments to see 
whether the investments have a reasonably high 
probability of remaining proﬁtable after a milk 
contamination scandal. 
•  A foreign ﬁrm with a minority equity interest 
in a domestic dairy company in China or other 
developing country may not be able to exercise 
the control needed to correct a problem in the 
event of a product scandal.
•  Firms investing in dairy businesses in developing 
countries need procedures to safeguard the entire 
milk supply chain from the farm to food markets. 
Failure to do so will expose a ﬁrm to problems 
such as those encountered by Chinese dairy 
processors when middlemen-assemblers added 
melamine and water to milk purchased from 
farmers before delivering it to processing plants. 
•  Firms investing in Chinaʼs dairy industry may 
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to invest in dairy processing 
ﬁrms that operate their own farms, particularly if 
Chinaʼs government fails to adopt measures that 
substantially improve the quality of the countryʼs 
milk. Integrated farming-processing ﬁrms can 
be operated in a fashion that maintains a quality 
milk supply. However, large, integrated dairy 
farming operations can be challenging to operate 
proﬁtably because of herd health problems and 
diseconomies of scale. Signiﬁcant problems with 
herd health, in particular, have been noted on 
Chinaʼs large dairy farms [16]. 
•  A multinational dairy companyʼs reputation 
for selling high quality dairy products can be 
damaged by problems in the ﬁrmʼs developing 
country units. For example, Fonterra found it 
necessary to withdraw Anmum Materna, a line of 
prenatal milk sold in China that it believed was 
contaminated by local milk. Fonterra announced 
that Anmum Materna sold outside of China was 
made from New Zealand milk [8]. The need to 
make such an announcement raises questions 
about a companyʼs products. While there is no 
evidence that New Zealand milk products were 
involved in the sales of any contaminated dairy 
products, Fonterra risks harming its brands and 
sullying the “clean-green” image of New Zealand 
dairy products as a result of association with 
problems encountered at Sanlu Dairy. 
•  Dairy exporters based in countries that have 
experienced a milk contamination scandal need 
to make concerted efforts to ensure that they 
export safe products. Any hints of a renewed 
ﬂare up of product contamination will be 
used by competing exporters to create real or 
“manufactured” concerns about product quality 
to gain market share at the expense of exporters 
based in countries with a history of product 
contamination. Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-4  15
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